Sea Limited posted US$22.9 billion in total GAAP revenue for the full year ended 31 December 2025 — a 36.4% increase from US$16.8 billion in 2024 — while net income for fiscal year 2025 reached US$1.6 billion, more than tripling from US$448 million the prior year.
The scale of that turnaround, from a company that burned cash aggressively to fund market share, is the defining fact about where Sea sits today: it has crossed from growth story to profit-generating platform. [Business Wire] [Futubull]
The structural tension is threefold. Shopee commands roughly 52% of Southeast Asia's e-commerce GMV, but TikTok Shop doubled its platform GMV to US$45.6 billion and is growing at 40–55% per year. In financial services, SeaMoney — now rebranded Monee — operates in a region where Grab Financial and GoTo are direct rivals. And across all of this, founder Forrest Li holds approximately 57.7% of aggregate voting power through a dual-class share structure, meaning any partner, investor, or counterpart is effectively dealing with a single decision-maker. [IPFoxy] [Digital in Asia] [PortersFiveForce.com] [Sea Limited / U.S. SEC (via StockTitan summary of Schedule 13D/A)]
Founded in 2009 as Garena and listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 2017, Sea operates Shopee, Monee (formerly SeaMoney), and Garena across Southeast Asia, Latin America, and select other markets.
Sea Limited describes itself as a consumer internet company operating three core businesses: e-commerce through Shopee, digital financial services through Monee (previously branded SeaMoney), and digital entertainment through Garena. Shopee is a mobile-centric marketplace that integrates payments, logistics, and fulfilment infrastructure directly into its platform, rather than treating them as separate third-party services. Garena provides access to mobile and PC online games that Sea develops, curates, licenses, and localises for individual markets, and also promotes eSports operations. Monee offers consumer and SME credit, e-wallets, payment processing, banking, insurtech, and wealth services. [Sea Limited (company filing, via Companies Market Cap)] [Yahoo Finance]
The company was incorporated in 2009 under the name Garena Interactive Holding Limited and changed its name to Sea Limited in April 2017, the same year it listed on the NYSE. Its stated mission is to better the lives of consumers and small businesses with technology. Headquartered at 1 Fusionopolis Place in Singapore, Sea operates primarily across seven countries in Southeast Asia — Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan — while also maintaining a growing presence in Latin America, particularly Brazil. [Yahoo Finance] [Sea Limited] [Wikipedia] [DBS Bank]
The three businesses are not independent verticals. Shopee drives e-commerce volume; Monee extends credit and payment services to Shopee's buyers and sellers; Garena generates user engagement and, historically, the cash that funded Shopee's expansion. This interdependence is the company's structural advantage: each platform feeds the others' user base and monetises the same underlying digital infrastructure. Sea generated US$16.82 billion in revenue in fiscal year 2024, growing to US$22.9 billion in fiscal year 2025. [Sea Limited] [Umbrex] [Business Wire]
Sea's primary customers are consumers shopping on Shopee, small and medium-sized businesses using Shopee's seller tools and Monee's credit products, and gamers on Garena's platform. The company describes Monee as a leading digital financial services provider in Southeast Asia with a growing presence in Latin America. Industry classifications for the company span consumer internet, e-commerce, digital financial services, and online gaming — a breadth that makes it more comparable to a regional super-app ecosystem than to any single-sector peer. [Sea Limited] [Umbrex]
The renaming of SeaMoney to Monee, referenced in Sea Limited's current investor materials, is a recent brand update not yet reflected in all third-party sources in this corpus. Facts referencing SeaMoney and Monee refer to the same business segment.
Total GAAP revenue reached US$22.9 billion in fiscal year 2025, up from US$16.8 billion in 2024, while net income grew from US$448 million to US$1.6 billion over the same period.
Sea's revenue trajectory shows consistent acceleration: US$16.8 billion in full year 2024, rising to US$22.9 billion in full year 2025 — a 36.4% increase. In Q1 2026 alone, total GAAP revenue reached US$7.1 billion, a 46.6% increase from US$4.8 billion in 2025. That quarterly run-rate, if sustained, implies full-year 2026 revenue well above the 2025 baseline, though management guidance for the e-commerce segment specifically targets 25% growth with a Shopee adjusted EBITDA target of US$1 billion for the full year 2026. [Business Wire] [StockTitan] [The Motley Fool]
| Period | Total GAAP Revenue |
|---|---|
| FY2024 | 16.8 US$ billions |
| FY2025 | 22.9 US$ billions |
| Q1 2026 | 7.1 US$ billions |
Profitability has improved sharply. Net income for fiscal year 2025 was US$1.6 billion, compared to US$448 million in 2024 — a 259.7% increase — with diluted EPS rising from US$0.74 to US$2.52. Operating cash flow reinforces the picture: US$5.0 billion in fiscal year 2025, up 51.5% from the prior year. At the segment level, group adjusted EBITDA for Q1 2026 was US$917.2 million, a 10.6% year-on-year increase. [Futubull] [Business Wire]
The balance sheet shows US$4.16 billion in cash and cash equivalents as of 31 December 2025, up from US$3.07 billion as of 30 September 2025. Sea's consumer lending business had an outstanding loan balance of more than US$3 billion at the end of 2024. These two figures should be read separately: the cash position reflects the parent group's liquidity, while the loan book reflects credit risk held within the Monee segment. The corpus does not disclose net debt or overall leverage ratios for the consolidated group, which represents a gap for any partner assessing Sea's balance sheet capacity. [Yahoo Finance] [Sea Limited]
The direction of travel is unambiguous: Sea moved from a business that prioritised market share at the cost of profit to one generating real cash flow. The open question is whether the growth rate in Q1 2026 can be sustained as TikTok Shop's competitive pressure intensifies in e-commerce — the segment that anchors Sea's financial performance.
The corpus does not provide full-year 2022 or 2023 revenue figures for Sea Limited, limiting the trend series to 2024 and 2025 as confirmed annual data points, with Q1 2026 as the most recent quarterly reading. Net debt and total borrowings are not disclosed in the retrieved corpus.
Shopee anchors the ecosystem, Monee monetises its credit and payment needs, and Garena provides engagement infrastructure — three businesses sharing a common digital base across Southeast Asia.
Sea conducts its three core businesses through subsidiaries and consolidated entities. Shopee is Sea's largest revenue driver and is described in the company's Form 20-F as the largest e-commerce platform in Southeast Asia and Taiwan. It functions as a mobile-first marketplace that integrates payments, logistics, and fulfilment within a single platform rather than outsourcing those functions — a structural choice that increases switching costs for both buyers and sellers but also requires significant ongoing capital to maintain. [Sea Limited] [Investing.com]
Garena is a global game developer and publisher that develops, curates, licenses, and localises mobile and PC games for individual markets. Garena was the original business that funded Shopee's early expansion, particularly through the global success of Free Fire, a battle royale game that Sea developed internally. Garena also promotes eSports operations across the region. The gaming segment's role has shifted over time: it remains operationally important but is no longer the group's primary revenue engine. [Sea Limited]
Monee — the rebranded SeaMoney — offers consumer and SME credit, mobile wallet services, payment processing, banking, and insurtech products. The business is described by Sea as a leading digital financial services provider in Southeast Asia with a growing presence in Brazil. Its strategic importance to the group is not just standalone revenue: Monee provides the credit and payments infrastructure that makes Shopee's marketplace more attractive to sellers who need working capital and to buyers who prefer instalment options over upfront payment. [Sea Limited]
The business model's coherence rests on user overlap. A consumer who shops on Shopee uses Monee's wallet to pay, may play a Garena game, and generates behavioural data that improves targeting across all three segments. Sea operates this model primarily across seven countries in Greater Southeast Asia. Revenue from variable interest entities — the legal structures Sea uses where foreign ownership restrictions apply — accounted for 5.8% of total revenue in 2022, the most recent year disclosed in the retrieved corpus, indicating that most revenue flows through directly owned entities rather than VIE structures. [DBS Bank] [Sea Limited (Form 20-F excerpt via CompaniesMarketCap.com)]
Sea's stated mission — to better the lives of consumers and small businesses with technology — is operationally expressed in Monee's SME credit products and Shopee's seller tools. For a potential partner, this mission framing matters: Sea positions itself as infrastructure for the small-business economy of Southeast Asia, not merely as a consumer shopping app. That positioning shapes which partnership types Sea will pursue and which it will resist. [Sea Limited]
Sea uses Class A shares (one vote each) and Class B shares (three votes each) to separate economic ownership from voting control — a structure that concentrates strategic authority with Li regardless of public market movements.
As of 30 December 2025, Forrest Xiaodong Li beneficially owned 104,615,356 shares of Sea Limited, representing approximately 16.1% of total issued and outstanding shares but approximately 57.7% of aggregate voting power. This gap between economic stake and voting control is the product of Sea's dual-class structure: Class B shares carry three votes per share, and Li holds Class B shares, as does Tencent. As of early 2022, Tencent held approximately 23.3% of voting rights, and the Class B shares owned by Tencent and Li together represented approximately 52% of Sea's total voting power at that time. The corpus does not contain a more recent breakdown of Tencent's current voting stake. [Sea Limited / U.S. SEC (via StockTitan summary of Schedule 13D/A)] [Free Malaysia Today]
The second material disclosed shareholder is Gang Ye, Sea's co-founder and Chief Operating Officer. As of 16 January 2026, Ye reported beneficial ownership of 27,267,872 Class A ordinary shares — approximately 4.4% of the Class A share class — but approximately 1.5% of aggregate voting power after accounting for 8,704,719 shares for which he appointed Li as his irrevocable voting proxy. That proxy arrangement means Ye has formally transferred a portion of his own voting influence to Li, reinforcing Li's effective control margin. Sea's board consists of seven members: Li as Chairman and CEO, Ye as Director and COO, David Ma as Director, and four independent or outside directors. For any partner, counterpart, or investor, the practical consequence is that Sea Limited's strategic decisions require Li's assent — board composition and minority shareholder positions do not alter that arithmetic. [Sea Limited / U.S. SEC (via StockTitan summary of Schedule 13G/A)] [Sea Limited]
Tencent's current precise voting stake is not confirmed in the retrieved corpus beyond the early 2022 figure. Any partner conducting detailed ownership diligence should verify Tencent's current position through Sea's most recent Form 20-F or SEC filings.
Li has served as Chairman and CEO since the company's inception in May 2009; co-founders Gang Ye and David Chen remain in senior operational roles alongside long-tenured CFO Tony Hou.
Forrest Li is the founder, Chairman, and CEO of Sea Limited and has held those roles since the company's inception in May 2009. He is also a board director and the dominant voting shareholder, which means the Chairman, CEO, and controlling shareholder roles are held by a single individual. Li studied at Shanghai Jiao Tong University before completing his MBA at Stanford — a background cited in secondary profiles as formative to his approach of combining deep technology conviction with aggressive market expansion. [Sea Limited] [Minds of Enterprise]
Gang Ye is the Chief Operating Officer and a board director. As co-founder, Ye has been part of Sea's leadership since its earliest days and plays a central operational role. He has delegated a portion of his Class A voting power to Li through an irrevocable proxy arrangement, as disclosed in his January 2026 SEC filing. David Chen — also a co-founder — serves as Chief Product Officer for Shopee, placing product strategy for Sea's largest revenue segment in the hands of one of the company's original architects. [Sea Limited] [Sea Limited / U.S. SEC (via StockTitan summary of Schedule 13G/A)]
Tony Hou is the Chief Financial Officer. He is described by secondary sources as a long-tenured CFO, reflecting the broader pattern of Sea's senior finance function remaining with founding-era executives. Chris Feng serves as President of Sea Limited. Terry Zhao is President of Garena, overseeing the gaming segment. Yanjun Wang is Chief Corporate Officer, a role that typically covers regulatory affairs, government relations, and corporate development. [Sea Limited] [KoalaGains]
The leadership profile is notably founder-centric and internally promoted. This has operational advantages: the founding team has navigated Sea through multiple business cycles, a near-existential Garena revenue decline as Free Fire's user base contracted, and a pivot to profitability that required discipline the early hyper-growth years did not demand. The risk that comes with this structure is standard for founder-led companies: strategic direction is personalised, succession planning is not publicly disclosed, and the departure of Li or Ye would create material institutional uncertainty. For a potential partner, the practical implication is that relationship development at the working level must be understood against a backdrop where the ultimate strategic decision-maker is a single founder with majority voting control.
The corpus does not contain educational or career background details for Gang Ye, Tony Hou, Chris Feng, Terry Zhao, Yanjun Wang, or David Chen beyond their current titles. Secondary sources confirm the founding team composition but do not provide independent verification of individual executives' prior roles.
Three platforms — Shopee, TikTok Shop (including Tokopedia), and Lazada — account for 98.8% of Southeast Asian e-commerce market share, making this a closed competition where any share TikTok Shop gains comes directly at Shopee's expense.
Shopee is described by Sea itself as the largest e-commerce platform in Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Independent estimates place its 2024 platform-based GMV share at approximately 52% of the Southeast Asian e-commerce market. That figure is consistent across multiple secondary sources reviewed for this report. Shopee built this position largely at the expense of Lazada, Alibaba's earlier Southeast Asian flagship, which has fallen to approximately 15% market share and an estimated US$19–20 billion in GMV. [Sea Limited] [IPFoxy] [Digital in Asia] [PortersFiveForce.com] [GabGrowth]
The more significant competitive dynamic is TikTok Shop's emergence. As of Q1 2026, TikTok Shop had doubled its platform GMV to US$45.6 billion, growing at 40–55% year-on-year according to Momentum Works. The three-player structure — Shopee, TikTok Shop including Tokopedia, and Lazada — accounted for 98.8% of the Southeast Asian e-commerce market in 2025. The market is effectively closed to new entrants, which means competitive intensity is entirely concentrated among these three. Shopee's 52% share and TikTok Shop's accelerating GMV are on a collision course, and Lazada's declining position will not provide a buffer. [Digital in Asia] [Momentum Works (via LinkedIn post)]
Beyond e-commerce, Sea competes with Grab and GoTo across the broader Southeast Asian consumer internet landscape. Grab Financial and GoTo are direct rivals to Monee in digital financial services — both offer competing e-wallet, credit, and insurance products to overlapping user bases. In gaming, Garena has faced declining active users as Free Fire's popularity has contracted from its peak, though the corpus does not contain a specific current active user figure for Garena. [Fortune] [PortersFiveForce.com]
Shopee's competitive advantages include its integrated logistics infrastructure — Shopee Express — which lowers fulfilment costs relative to marketplaces that rely solely on third-party couriers. Its mobile-first design has historically driven download leadership: Shopee was the most-downloaded shopping app across the six biggest Southeast Asian markets in a recent year per App Annie, covering Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Singapore. The strategic question for any partner is whether Shopee's ecosystem depth — payments, logistics, and lending all integrated — is sufficient to retain GMV share against TikTok Shop's entertainment-commerce model, which acquires users through video content rather than price-led discovery. [South China Morning Post]
TikTok Shop GMV figures are sourced from Momentum Works via a LinkedIn post summarising their 2025 research. The 98.8% three-player concentration figure originates from the same Momentum Works source. These are Tier 3 in provenance but are the most widely cited independent estimates in this space and are consistent with directional evidence from other sources. Treat them as indicative rather than audited.
Sea disclosed in its Form 20-F for the year ended 31 December 2024 that its top three markets accounted for over half of total digital financial services revenue — a concentration that creates segment-level vulnerability to regulatory or macroeconomic shocks in those markets.
Sea disclosed that its digital financial services revenue is currently concentrated, with the top three markets accounting for over half of total digital financial services revenue in 2024. The specific markets are not named in the retrieved corpus, but given Monee's stated primary footprint in Southeast Asia and its growing presence in Brazil, the concentration almost certainly reflects Indonesia, one or two other major SEA markets, and potentially Brazil — though this cannot be confirmed without the full Form 20-F text. For a potential partner in digital financial services, this concentration means that operating conditions in a small number of markets effectively determine segment performance. Revenue from variable interest entities — the legal structure used where foreign ownership restrictions apply — accounted for 5.8% of total group revenue in 2022, indicating that VIE-related concentration risk is modest at the group level, though conditions may have shifted since that disclosure. The three core businesses — Garena, Shopee, and Monee — remain the only disclosed revenue segments, with no further sub-segment breakdowns available in the retrieved corpus. [Sea Limited (Form 20-F excerpt via CompaniesMarketCap.com)] [Sea Limited]
The specific countries comprising the top three digital financial services markets are not identified in the retrieved corpus. The VIE revenue share figure is from 2022, the most recent year disclosed; more recent data is not available in this corpus.
Three concrete strategic commitments define Sea's current direction: a 1.4-million square-foot mega warehouse in Malaysia, a consumer lending book exceeding US$3 billion, and a full-year 2026 Shopee EBITDA target of US$1 billion.
Sea's logistics investment in Malaysia is a tangible signal of Shopee's infrastructure ambitions. A newly constructed two-storey, 1.4-million square-foot mega warehouse at Bukit Raja, Klang — described by Malaysia's Ministry of International Trade and Industry as among the largest logistics warehouses in Malaysia — will expand Shopee's fulfilment capability in a market where it competes directly with TikTok Shop and Lazada. Infrastructure of this scale reduces Shopee's dependence on third-party logistics providers and is consistent with the platform strategy of internalising services that drive loyalty and cost efficiency. [Ministry of International Trade and Industry Malaysia (MITI)]
In consumer lending, Sea reported that Monee's outstanding loan balance exceeded US$3 billion at the end of 2024, describing it as one of the largest consumer lending businesses in Southeast Asia. This is not a side product: a loan book of this scale sitting on Sea's platform means Monee is a material credit institution, not merely a payment processor. The credit risk associated with this book, and how it performs through economic cycles, is a consequential question for any partner considering integration with Monee's financial infrastructure. Management set an adjusted EBITDA target of US$1 billion for the Shopee segment for full-year 2026, while maintaining e-commerce growth guidance of 25%. Achieving both simultaneously — growth and margin — in the face of TikTok Shop's GMV acceleration would represent a meaningful strategic proof point. [Sea Limited] [The Motley Fool]
The corpus does not contain Sea's formal strategic plan or multi-year capital allocation disclosures beyond these three items. The EBITDA target and growth guidance are management statements from the 2026 earnings call transcript.
Morningstar Sustainalytics assigns Sea a medium-risk ESG rating of 22.9 points, placing it 619th out of 1,094 companies assessed in the Software and Services category.
Morningstar Sustainalytics assigns Sea Limited an ESG Risk Rating score of 22.9 points, placing it in the medium-risk category within the Software and Services industry universe. In a regional comparison, GoTo rated lower risk with a score of 17 (better performance), while Grab scored 23.9 (slightly higher risk than Sea). Sea's ranking within the Software and Services category is 619th out of 1,094 assessed companies, compared to GoTo's 196th. LSEG assigns Sea an overall ESG Rating of 26 points. These scores reflect assessed exposure to ESG risks rather than a direct measure of the company's ESG practices, and they should be read alongside Sea's regulatory track record — including the Indonesian competition law admission and the India gaming ban — when forming a complete view of Sea's non-financial risk profile. [The Jakarta Post] [KnowESG]
The Sustainalytics score of 22.9 is consistent across three sources in the corpus (The Jakarta Post, KnowESG, and Detik Finance), all drawing from the same 2024 Morningstar research. The score may have been updated since the 2024 publication date; current-year verification against Sustainalytics' live database is recommended for formal ESG diligence.
The most material regulatory developments involve Shopee's admitted violation of Indonesian competition law in 2024 and the 2022 Indian government ban on Garena's Free Fire on national security grounds.
Indonesia's competition authority KPPU investigated Shopee for algorithmically favouring its own delivery service, Shopee Express, over third-party couriers on the seller dashboard. A KPPU hearing on 28 May 2024 confirmed that Shopee's platform had discriminated in the selection of shipping service companies that were automatically activated in bulk on the seller dashboard. Shopee subsequently admitted to violating Indonesian competition Law No. 5 of 1999 in relation to courier services on its platform and agreed to adjust its practices. This is not a minor procedural issue: it is an admission by Sea's e-commerce subsidiary of unlawful conduct in its largest market, arising from a business model choice — integrating logistics to reduce third-party dependence — that Sea has pursued deliberately as a competitive strategy. The same integrated logistics approach that reduces Sea's costs created the anticompetitive condition the KPPU identified. [The Straits Times] [CNBC]
Indonesia's antitrust authority KPPU investigated Shopee, Sea Limited's e-commerce arm, for potentially unfairly favouring its own delivery service Shopee Express over other shipping options through its platform algorithm. A KPPU hearing was held on 28 May 2024. KPPU found that Shopee had 'discriminated in the selection of shipping service companies that are automatically activated in bulk on the seller dashboard,' with Shopee Express and J&T Express alleged to have been automatically prioritised, disadvantaging other couriers with good service records. Shopee subsequently admitted to violating Indonesian competition law and agreed to adjust its practices.
In February 2022, the Indian government banned Garena's Free Fire — a mobile game owned by Singapore-based Sea Limited — under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, on national security grounds. The app was blocked along with 54 other applications suspected of transmitting user data to servers located in China. Sea Limited responded by stating it is a Singaporean company that does not transfer or store any Indian user data in China, and sent a letter to India's technology ministry seeking clarification. Singapore's government also raised diplomatic concerns, asking whether the ban on Free Fire had been unintentional. Separately, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) dismissed two antitrust complaints against Shopee on 3 March 2022, finding it a new entrant lacking significant market power.
On 24 October 2018, shareholder rights law firm Robbins LLP announced it was investigating whether certain officers and directors of Sea Limited — which engages in digital entertainment, e-commerce, and digital financial services across Greater Southeast Asia — violated U.S. federal securities laws. No further outcome details are recorded in the available fact slice beyond the announcement of the investigation.
In India, the government banned Garena's Free Fire in February 2022 under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act on national security grounds, as part of a broader action covering 54 additional applications suspected of transmitting user data to servers in China. Sea's response emphasised its Singaporean identity and stated that it does not transfer or store Indian user data in China. Singapore's government separately raised diplomatic concerns with India, asking whether the Free Fire ban was unintentional. The ban has not been lifted in the corpus period and represented a material loss of a high-growth market for Garena at the time of the action. [TechCrunch] [Reuters] [Gigazine]
A shareholder investigation was announced in October 2018 by Robbins LLP, examining whether certain officers and directors of Sea Limited violated U.S. federal securities laws. The corpus does not contain information about the outcome of this investigation, which was announced at the time of Sea's early post-IPO period. No finding, settlement, or dismissal is confirmed in the retrieved facts. [Robbins LLP]
The regulatory picture that emerges is consistent with Sea's growth model: aggressive platform integration creates competitive advantages but generates regulatory surface area. The KPPU case is the clearest example — Sea built Shopee Express into a structural advantage, and that same integration became the basis of a competition law violation. Any partner considering integration with Shopee's logistics, payment, or data infrastructure should assess how a similar dynamic might apply to their own market participation.
No information is available in this corpus about the current status of the 2018 Robbins LLP shareholder investigation. The India Free Fire ban status post-2022 is also not updated in the retrieved corpus. Both items may have been resolved without public disclosure, or may remain open.
Analyst view Sea Limited has done something rare: it built three separately scaled businesses — e-commerce, digital financial services, and gaming — that share infrastructure and user data in a region where most competitors have only one of the three. [Sea Limited] The financial results for 2025 confirm that this flywheel is now generating real cash, with operating cash flow of US$5.0 billion and net income of US$1.6 billion. [Futubull] The condition that would change this view is TikTok Shop's GMV trajectory: if it reaches parity with Shopee's SEA share within two to three years, the economics of Sea's e-commerce segment — and by extension, the cross-subsidy to Monee — come under pressure in a way the current numbers do not yet reflect.
A potential partner should note that the dual-class voting structure means strategic alignment with Sea Limited is alignment with Forrest Li specifically. Gang Ye's 27.3 million Class A shares represent approximately 1.5% of aggregate voting power after proxy arrangements, and no other disclosed shareholder approaches Li's 57.7%. [Sea Limited / U.S. SEC] This concentration is neither unusual for founder-led Asian tech companies nor inherently problematic, but it shapes how partnership terms, exclusivity arrangements, and long-term commitments should be framed.
This report covers Sea Limited — its business model, financial trajectory, ownership structure, leadership, competitive position, strategic moves, and regulatory standing — as of 2026.
Written for potential partners evaluating a commercial or strategic relationship with Sea Limited, particularly those needing to understand how the company makes money, who controls it, and where its risks sit.
This report was built by synthesising pre-verified sourced facts drawn from Sea Limited's regulatory filings, earnings releases, SEC disclosures, and a range of Tier 1 and Tier 2 publications covering the company and its competitive environment.
Financial data is current to Q1 2026; ownership disclosures reflect December 2025 and January 2026 SEC filings; some competitive market-share figures are based in 2024 estimates.
All monetary figures are denominated in US dollars as reported by Sea Limited in its filings and earnings releases. No currency conversions have been applied.
Research conducted 31 Aug 2026. All statistics carry inline citation markers.
This report is produced for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial, legal, or investment advice. All data is sourced from publicly available information as at the date of research. Renatus Ventures makes no representations as to the completeness or accuracy of third-party data.
Shopee's SEA e-commerce GMV share — IPFoxy (2026): approximately 52% of Southeast Asia e-commerce GMV in 2024 vs Digital in Asia (2026): approximately 53% of platform e-commerce GMV in 2025. Both figures are used as directionally consistent; the 52% figure for 2024 is treated as the primary reference since it aligns with the more precisely dated IPFoxy claim for 2024, while the 53% figure reflects a slightly more recent 2025 estimate.
Tencent's current voting stake in Sea Limited: the most recent figure in the corpus is from early 2022 (23.3% of voting rights). Any partner requiring current Tencent ownership data should consult Sea's most recent Form 20-F.
Garena active user count and revenue breakdown: the corpus does not contain a current active user figure or standalone revenue figure for Garena, limiting analysis of the gaming segment's financial trajectory.
Sea Limited's net debt, total borrowings, and consolidated leverage ratios are not disclosed in the retrieved corpus, creating a gap in balance sheet assessment.
The specific countries comprising Monee's top three digital financial services revenue markets are not identified in the retrieved corpus excerpt.
The outcome of the October 2018 Robbins LLP shareholder investigation is not available in the retrieved corpus.
The current status of the India Free Fire ban post-2022 is not updated in the retrieved corpus.
Full-year revenue figures for 2022 and 2023 are not present in the corpus, limiting the revenue trend series to FY2024, FY2025, and Q1 2026.
