Renatus products are primarily structured around established, best-practice frameworks for behaviour and decision-making. Where a single framework leaves gaps, we combine several — each covering what the others miss — to give a more complete picture.
Market, financial, and compensation reports are built on authoritative data rather than frameworks, because those questions are answered by accurate sourcing, not by an analytical lens.
The table below shows what sits behind every product — frameworks where frameworks apply, data sources where they don’t.
Renatus applies the underlying principles of established methods and credits their origin where relevant. Named frameworks, methods, and instruments are the property of their respective owners. Reference to them does not imply endorsement or affiliation.
| Product | Source | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Brand & Reputation Analysis | Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. |
| Established brand-research practice (voice-of-customer; sentiment analysis) | Catalogues controversies and reads sentiment drivers from public sources rather than relying on assertion. Grounds reputation analysis in observable signal. | |
| Established risk-management practice (likelihood × impact); ISO 31000 | Scores exposures by likelihood and impact so a list of concerns becomes a ranked, comparable view. Surfaces which risks warrant action and which can be monitored. | |
| City Intelligence | Established benchmarking practice | Scores a place against a defined peer set on shared dimensions so a single subject becomes a relative read. Turns "good or bad" into "better or worse than what". |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Company Deep Dive | Porter, M. E. (1985), Competitive Advantage (Free Press) | Breaks an industry or business into its constituent activities to show where value and cost actually accrue. Maps where margin concentrates rather than treating the whole as one block. |
| Established governance practice (agency theory; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) | Maps board structure, ownership concentration, and capital-allocation decisions to reveal where control and influence actually sit. Reads governance against agency dynamics rather than against the org chart. | |
| Company Profile | Established governance practice (agency theory; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) | Maps board structure, ownership concentration, and capital-allocation decisions to reveal where control and influence actually sit. Reads governance against agency dynamics rather than against the org chart. |
| Competitive Landscape | Porter, M. E. (1979), Harvard Business Review | Reads industry profitability through five competitive forces — rivalry, new entrants, substitutes, buyer power, supplier power. Shows where structural pressure comes from rather than focusing on direct competitors alone. |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Country Intelligence | World Bank indicators (authoritative public dataset) | World Bank indicators — an authoritative public data source used as primary input for this report's analysis. |
| IMF and ADB economic outlook data (authoritative public dataset) | IMF and ADB economic outlook data — an authoritative public data source used as primary input for this report's analysis. | |
| Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (authoritative public dataset) | Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index — an authoritative public data source used as primary input for this report's analysis. | |
| WEF Global Competitiveness Index (authoritative public dataset) | WEF Global Competitiveness Index — an authoritative public data source used as primary input for this report's analysis. | |
| Aguilar, F. (1967) — ETPS, basis of PEST/PESTLE | Maps the external macro forces — political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental — that shape an environment a business cannot control. Ensures the external context is read systematically rather than selectively. | |
| Established international-economics practice (gravity model; Tinbergen, J., 1962) | Examines volume, value, direction, and barriers in trade between markets, drawing on gravity-model reasoning. Grounds cross-border analysis in flows and frictions rather than impressions. | |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Cross-Border Trade Analysis | Established international-economics practice (gravity model; Tinbergen, J., 1962) | Examines volume, value, direction, and barriers in trade between markets, drawing on gravity-model reasoning. Grounds cross-border analysis in flows and frictions rather than impressions. |
| Customer Intelligence | Christensen, C. (2003, 2016); Ulwick, A. (2005) | Clayton Christensen's framework (2003, 2016) that frames what customers actually hire a product to accomplish, beyond who they are demographically. Anchors analysis in the job the customer is trying to get done. |
| Established brand-research practice (voice-of-customer; sentiment analysis) | Catalogues controversies and reads sentiment drivers from public sources rather than relying on assertion. Grounds customer-perception analysis in observable signal. | |
| Distribution Channels | Porter, M. E. (1985), Competitive Advantage (Free Press) | Breaks an industry or business into its constituent activities to show where value and cost actually accrue. Maps where margin concentrates rather than treating the whole as one block. |
| Porter, M. E. (1979), Harvard Business Review | Reads industry profitability through five competitive forces — rivalry, new entrants, substitutes, buyer power, supplier power. Shows where structural pressure comes from rather than focusing on direct competitors alone. | |
| ESG & Reputational Risk | Established risk-management practice (likelihood × impact); ISO 31000 | Scores exposures by likelihood and impact so a list of concerns becomes a ranked, comparable view. Surfaces which risks warrant action and which can be monitored. |
| Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (now ISSB/IFRS), 2018 | The SASB standards (2018, now under the ISSB/IFRS Foundation) define industry-specific sustainability disclosure topics. Used here as the reference for which ESG factors are financially material by sector. | |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Executive Search Intelligence | Established total-rewards practice (job evaluation; market pricing) | Tests pay against defined ranges by job and component, and reads pay-band drift against market. Grounds compensation reads in structured market data rather than anecdote. |
| Financial Health Analysis | Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. |
| Established financial-analysis practice (credit analysis; ratio analysis) | Reads a company's financial health through cash-flow reconciliation, debt-maturity profile, and ratio analysis. Grounds the picture in reported figures rather than narrative. | |
| Geopolitical Risks | Aguilar, F. (1967) — ETPS, basis of PEST/PESTLE | Maps the external macro forces — political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental — that shape an environment a business cannot control. Ensures the external context is read systematically rather than selectively. |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Industry Career Map | Established total-rewards practice (job evaluation; market pricing) | Tests pay against defined ranges by job and component, and reads pay-band drift against market. Grounds compensation reads in structured market data rather than anecdote. |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Industry Intelligence | Porter, M. E. (1985), Competitive Advantage (Free Press) | Breaks an industry or business into its constituent activities to show where value and cost actually accrue. Maps where margin concentrates rather than treating the whole as one block. |
| Foster, R. (1986), Innovation: The Attacker's Advantage | Locates a technology on its adoption and performance curve and reads when the next one is poised to overtake it. Shows whether a technology is emerging, maturing, or being displaced. | |
| Issue Briefing | Freeman, R. E. (1984), Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach | Maps the actors in a situation by stake, position, and power. Surfaces who is affected, who holds influence, and where positions conflict. |
| Market Intelligence | Porter, M. E. (1979), Harvard Business Review | Reads industry profitability through five competitive forces — rivalry, new entrants, substitutes, buyer power, supplier power. Shows where structural pressure comes from rather than focusing on direct competitors alone. |
| Porter, M. E. (1985), Competitive Advantage (Free Press) | Breaks an industry or business into its constituent activities to show where value and cost actually accrue. Maps where margin concentrates rather than treating the whole as one block. | |
| Aguilar, F. (1967) — ETPS, basis of PEST/PESTLE | Maps the external macro forces — political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental — that shape an environment a business cannot control. Ensures the external context is read systematically rather than selectively. | |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Policy Analysis | Freeman, R. E. (1984), Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach | Maps the actors in a situation by stake, position, and power. Surfaces who is affected, who holds influence, and where positions conflict. |
| Regulatory Environment | Aguilar, F. (1967) — ETPS, basis of PEST/PESTLE | Maps the external macro forces — political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental — that shape an environment a business cannot control. Ensures the external context is read systematically rather than selectively. |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Regulatory Risk | Aguilar, F. (1967) — ETPS, basis of PEST/PESTLE | Maps the external macro forces — political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental — that shape an environment a business cannot control. Ensures the external context is read systematically rather than selectively. |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Risk Assessment | Aguilar, F. (1967) — ETPS, basis of PEST/PESTLE | Originating in Francis Aguilar's (1967) ETPS scanning, PESTLE maps the external macro forces — political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental — a business cannot control. Ensures external risk is read across every category, not just the obvious ones. |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Supplier Landscape | Porter, M. E. (1979), Harvard Business Review | Reads industry profitability through five competitive forces — rivalry, new entrants, substitutes, buyer power, supplier power. Shows where structural pressure comes from rather than focusing on direct competitors alone. |
| Established supply-chain practice (HHI concentration) | Measures concentration across the supply base — for example, by Herfindahl–Hirschman Index — to find single points of dependence. Shows where reliance on one source creates risk. | |
| Supply Chain Risk | Established risk-management practice (likelihood × impact); ISO 31000 | Scores exposures by likelihood and impact so a list of concerns becomes a ranked, comparable view. Surfaces which risks warrant action and which can be monitored. |
| Established supply-chain practice (HHI concentration) | Measures concentration across the supply base — for example, by Herfindahl–Hirschman Index — to find single points of dependence. Shows where reliance on one source creates risk. | |
| Technology Landscape | Foster, R. (1986), Innovation: The Attacker's Advantage | Locates a technology on its adoption and performance curve and reads when the next one is poised to overtake it. Shows whether a technology is emerging, maturing, or being displaced. |
| Fenn, J. — Gartner (1995) | Gartner's (1995) model placing a technology on the curve from inflated expectations through disillusionment to productive use. Separates genuine readiness from hype. | |
| Your Competitive Landscape | Porter, M. E. (1979), Harvard Business Review | Reads industry profitability through five competitive forces — rivalry, new entrants, substitutes, buyer power, supplier power. Shows where structural pressure comes from rather than focusing on direct competitors alone. |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible futures and tests a plan or position against each rather than relying on a single forecast. Produces direction that holds up across more than one way things could unfold. | |
| Your Market Intelligence | Established service-design / CX practice | A service-design method that maps the full path a customer takes across touchpoints, surfacing where the experience works and where it breaks. Grounds analysis in the customer's actual sequence rather than internal process. |
| Established market-sizing practice (venture / strategy) | Standard market-sizing practice that scales a market from total addressable down to the share realistically serviceable and obtainable. Grounds opportunity estimates in layered, sourced figures rather than one headline number. |
| Product | Source | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Audit your metrics | Goodhart, C. (1975); formulation by Strathern, M. (1997) | Holds that a measure stops being a good measure once it becomes a target. Warns that optimising for a metric can quietly defeat the goal it was meant to track. |
| Kaplan, R. & Norton, D. (1992, 1996), Harvard Business Review | Pairs the headline metric with a counter-metric that catches the predictable distortion when the headline is optimised in isolation. Stops a single number from being gamed at the expense of the outcome it represents. | |
| Kaplan, R. & Norton, D. (1992, 1996), Harvard Business Review | Separates numbers that look impressive from numbers that change a decision, and demotes the rest. Tests each metric for whether anyone would do something different if it moved. | |
| Build your board report | Kaplan, R. & Norton, D. (1992, 1996), Harvard Business Review | Frames each board paper around the decision it asks the board to take, with the financial, customer, operational, and learning views set out as evidence for that decision. Stops a board pack from reading as report-and-noted material. |
| Established management-accounting method (Horngren, C., Cost Accounting) | Surfaces only the lines that fall outside expected ranges, so attention goes to what has actually changed. Keeps a long report from burying the few numbers that need a board decision. | |
| Established management-accounting method (Horngren, C., Cost Accounting) | Compares each planned figure against the actual outcome and explains the gap by its driver. Turns a number that's "off" into a specific, addressable cause rather than a vague miss. | |
| Build your fundraising strategy | Established venture-finance practice (Gompers, P. & Lerner, J., The Venture Capital Cycle, 1999) | Matches the round and the investor type to the company's stage, traction, and risk profile. Stops a pitch landing with the wrong audience for the moment. |
| Established venture-finance practice (Gompers, P. & Lerner, J., The Venture Capital Cycle, 1999) | Sizes the round and shapes the terms against the milestones the capital is meant to fund. Aligns what is raised with what the next eighteen months actually need to prove. | |
| Nagle, T. & Holden, R. — The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing (1987) | Weighs each term — valuation, preference, control, anti-dilution — for the long-run cost it carries, not just its headline. Makes explicit what is given up in exchange for the cash. | |
| Build your go-to-market strategy | Project-management practice; popularised via PMI/PMBOK; roots in responsibility charting (1950s) | Names, for each task, who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed. Removes the ambiguity over ownership that quietly stalls cross-team work. |
| Established GTM practice; positioning (Ries, A. & Trout, J., 1981) | Aligns the target segment, the positioning claim, the channel to reach them, and the price into one coherent plan. Stops a launch where the four pull in different directions. | |
| Established GTM practice; positioning (Ries, A. & Trout, J., 1981) | Breaks a launch into time-boxed sprints with explicit go/no-go gates between phases. Replaces a single big-bang launch with phases that can be steered as evidence arrives. | |
| Build your pricing strategy | Kaplan, R. & Norton, D. (1992, 1996), Harvard Business Review | Sets price anchors and tier structure together so each tier has a clear job — to draw attention, to sell, or to make the middle look reasonable. Designs the menu, not just the numbers on it. |
| Nagle, T. & Holden, R. — The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing (1987) | Weighs price against the value a customer receives and the alternatives they have, rather than against internal cost. Shows where there's room to price up, where to hold, and where pricing power has eroded. | |
| Nagle, T. & Holden, R. — The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing (1987) | Sets price by the value a customer receives rather than the cost to produce. Anchors the price conversation in worth to the buyer instead of internal cost-plus. | |
| Business Model Analysis | Osterwalder, A. & Pigneur, Y. (2010), Business Model Generation (Wiley) | Maps a business across nine connected blocks on one page, from customer segments and value proposition to cost structure and revenue streams. Shows how the parts fit together, so a gap or contradiction becomes visible at a glance. |
| Osterwalder, A., Pigneur, Y., Bernarda, G. & Smith, A. (2014), Value Proposition Design (Wiley) | Lines up what a product offers against what customers actually need — their jobs, pains, and gains. Surfaces the mismatch between what a business builds and what its customers are trying to get done. | |
| Business Plan | Established financial-modelling practice | Builds a forecast upward from real unit-level drivers — customers, price, conversion — rather than down from a top-down target. Produces projections grounded in mechanics that can be defended line by line. |
| Blank, S. (2005), The Four Steps to the Epiphany | Tests business assumptions against real customers through discovery and validation before scaling. Replaces building in isolation with evidence from the people meant to buy. | |
| — | ||
| Choose the right financing structure | Corporate-finance principle (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; matching principle) | Lines up the timing of cash needs and cash arrivals with the maturity and repayment shape of each funding source. Stops short-term money funding long-life assets, or the reverse. |
| Real options theory (Trigeorgis, L., 1996); strategic fit (Porter, M. E.) | Tests combinations of instruments against each other, weighing how each layer behaves if conditions turn. Treats a financing stack as a portfolio rather than a single best choice. | |
| Corporate-finance principle (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; matching principle) | Weighs each financing instrument on cost, control, and flexibility together, not headline rate alone. Surfaces the hidden trade-off in choices that look cheap on one axis. | |
| Decide between career options | Klein, G. (2007), Harvard Business Review | Imagines the decision has already failed, then works backwards to name why. Surfaces the risks and fragile assumptions that optimism hides, while there is still time to act on them. |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds several plausible career futures ten years out and tests today's decision against each. Replaces a single forecast with a view that holds across more than one way the career could unfold. | |
| Pugh, S. (1981) — Pugh Controlled Convergence | Scores each option against weighted criteria and totals the result, so the basis of the choice is explicit and comparable. Stops the decision being made by the loudest preference in the room. | |
| Evaluate a partnership | Real options theory (Trigeorgis, L., 1996); strategic fit (Porter, M. E.) | Tests whether the value each partner gets out of the deal matches what they put in, over the life of the arrangement. Surfaces structural imbalance that becomes a slow source of resentment. |
| Klein, G. (2007), Harvard Business Review | Imagines the partnership has already failed on governance grounds, then works backwards to name the decision rights, escalation paths, and exit triggers that should have been agreed up front. Surfaces the governance gaps before they bite. | |
| Real options theory (Trigeorgis, L., 1996); strategic fit (Porter, M. E.) | Tests how well the partnership reinforces existing strategy and capability rather than pulling away from them. Distinguishes a deal that compounds direction from one that quietly dilutes it. | |
| Evaluate personal finance | Wieser, F. von (1914), foundational economics concept | Weighs a choice against the value of the best alternative it rules out. Makes the real cost of a decision visible — not just what it takes, but what it forecloses. |
| Established risk-analysis practice; codified in banking (Basel Committee) | Tests how a plan or position holds up under severe but plausible adverse conditions. Surfaces where something breaks before reality does the testing. | |
| Execution Plan | Adapted from agile sprint practice (Sutherland, J. & Schwaber, K., Scrum, 1995) | Frames the first 90 days into focused phases with clear milestones. Turns a long ambition into a sequence short enough to manage and measure. |
| Kelley, J. & Walker, M. (1959), DuPont/Remington Rand | Finds the sequence of dependent tasks that sets the minimum project duration. Shows which tasks actually move the end date and which have slack, so attention goes where delay would cost most. | |
| Doerr, J. (2018). Measure What Matters. Portfolio. Originated by Andy Grove at Intel (1970s); popularised at Google. | Pairs an ambitious objective with a few measurable key results that show whether it was actually met. Forces the difference between intent and evidence, so progress is tracked by outcome rather than activity. | |
| Doran, G. T. (1981), Management Review | Sets goals that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Turns a vague intention into a target clear enough to know whether it has been hit. | |
| KPI Framework: Company Level | Kaplan, R. & Norton, D. (1992), Harvard Business Review | Measures performance across four linked views — financial, customer, internal process, and learning and growth — rather than financial results alone. Connects day-to-day activity with the outcomes an organisation is trying to reach. |
| KPI Framework: Individual Level | Doerr, J. (2018). Measure What Matters. Portfolio. Originated by Andy Grove at Intel (1970s); popularised at Google. | Pairs an ambitious objective with a few measurable key results that show whether it was actually met. Forces the difference between intent and evidence, so progress is tracked by outcome rather than activity. |
| KPI Framework: Manager Level | Doerr, J. (2018). Measure What Matters. Portfolio. Originated by Andy Grove at Intel (1970s); popularised at Google. | Pairs an ambitious objective with a few measurable key results that show whether it was actually met. Forces the difference between intent and evidence, so progress is tracked by outcome rather than activity. |
| Make vs Buy | Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, O., 1985); Value Chain (Porter, M. E., 1985) | Tests each activity against whether it should be built, bought, or partnered, and where value and cost actually sit. Grounds a sourcing decision in economics rather than habit. |
| Real options theory (Trigeorgis, L., 1996); strategic fit (Porter, M. E.) | Judges a sourcing move not only on its immediate payoff but on the future choices it keeps open. Values flexibility under uncertainty, not just first-order return. | |
| Ellram, L. (1993); popularised by Gartner | Counts the full lifetime cost of a decision — acquisition, operation, maintenance, disposal — not just the purchase price. Reveals the cheaper-looking option that costs more over time. | |
| Opportunity Assessment | Dewar, J. (RAND), 1993/2002 | Builds a plan around its load-bearing assumptions and prepares for the ones most likely to break. Makes hidden dependencies explicit so they can be watched and hedged. |
| Blank, S. (2005), The Four Steps to the Epiphany | Tests business assumptions against real customers through discovery and validation before scaling. Replaces building in isolation with evidence from the people meant to buy. | |
| Wieser, F. von (1914), foundational economics concept | Weighs a choice against the value of the best alternative it rules out. Makes the real cost of a decision visible — not just what it takes, but what it forecloses. | |
| Porter, M. E. (1980), Competitive Strategy (Free Press) | Defines how a business competes through three generic strategies — cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. Forces a clear choice of competitive ground rather than trying to be everything at once. | |
| Osterwalder, A., Pigneur, Y., Bernarda, G. & Smith, A. (2014), Value Proposition Design (Wiley) | Lines up what a product offers against what customers actually need — their jobs, pains, and gains. Surfaces the mismatch between what a business builds and what its customers are trying to get done. | |
| Plan your relocation | Multi-criteria decision analysis (Keeney, R. L. & Raiffa, H., 1976) | Scores each candidate destination against the factors that actually matter for the move — cost of living, work, schooling, lifestyle, logistics — on one comparable frame. Turns a gut-feel preference into a structured comparison. |
| Klein, G. (2007), Harvard Business Review | Imagines the move has already gone badly, then works backwards to name the specific things that went wrong. Surfaces the practical, financial, and personal risks while they can still be planned for. | |
| Position your offering | — | Forces a deliberate choice between competing inside an existing market category or claiming a new one, and names the cost and burden of proof each path carries. Stops a positioning effort from quietly defaulting to "new category" or "best in class" without earning either. |
| — | Works through positioning as five linked moves — the competitive alternatives, the unique attributes, the value those attributes enable, the segment that values them most, and the market category to claim. Builds a position the market can actually place, not a slogan it can't. | |
| Problem Analysis | Toyoda, S. / Toyota Production System (Ohno, T.), 1950s | Asks "why" repeatedly — conventionally five times — until the chain of cause reaches a root that can actually be acted on. Stops investigation at the first plausible explanation rather than the first available one. |
| — | ||
| Review budget vs plan | Established management-accounting method (Horngren, C., Cost Accounting) | Pulls out the variances that cancel each other at the headline level and would otherwise stay hidden. Stops a net-zero summary from masking offsetting wins and losses underneath. |
| Established management-accounting method (Horngren, C., Cost Accounting) | Filters variance review for the gaps that change a decision, not every line that drifted. Keeps the conversation on the few numbers that warrant action. | |
| Established management-accounting method (Horngren, C., Cost Accounting) | Sorts each variance by cause — price, volume, mix, timing, one-off — rather than leaving it as a single number. Routes each gap to the function that can actually fix it. | |
| Review compensation honestly | Established total-rewards practice (job evaluation; pay-band architecture) | Checks each role's pay against its defined band and the market range, so out-of-band cases surface by exception rather than anecdote. Shows where pay structure has drifted from intent. |
| Established total-rewards practice (job evaluation; pay-band architecture) | Maps where retention risk concentrates — by role, by tenure, by pay decile — rather than treating the whole population as one. Shows where a small number of departures would hurt disproportionately. | |
| Corporate-finance principle (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; matching principle) | Costs a pay refresh at both the role level and the company level, so the local fix and the systemic cost are visible together. Stops a fair-looking individual adjustment from quietly compounding into an unaffordable bill. | |
| Review the operating model | Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, O., 1985); Value Chain (Porter, M. E., 1985) | Sorts each capability gap by whether it should be built, bought, partnered, or accepted as out-of-scope. Routes each gap to a sourcing decision rather than leaving it as a generic weakness. |
| Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, O., 1985); Value Chain (Porter, M. E., 1985) | Locates where work falls between functions — the seams where ownership ends but the process doesn't. Surfaces handoff loss that no single team would call its own. | |
| Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, O., 1985); Value Chain (Porter, M. E., 1985) | Traces the end-to-end path by which a unit of value reaches the customer, across functions and systems. Shows where the work actually happens and where it queues, hands off, or duplicates. | |
| Review the unit economics honestly | Established financial-analysis practice (contribution margin; LTV/CAC) | Breaks unit economics down by acquisition channel and customer segment, so blended averages don't hide the parts that lose money. Shows where the economics work and where scale would compound loss. |
| Established financial-analysis practice (contribution margin; LTV/CAC) | Calculates customer lifetime value from real cohort retention curves rather than a steady-state assumption. Stops LTV from being inflated by survivors and shows when the curve actually flattens. | |
| Established financial-analysis practice (contribution margin; LTV/CAC) | Tests each unit of activity for contribution margin — revenue minus its direct variable cost — before fixed cost is loaded in. Shows whether more volume helps or hurts. | |
| Strategic Priorities | Intercom (McBride, S.), 2016 | A prioritisation method developed at Intercom (2016) that scores each option on reach, impact, confidence, and effort, then ranks by the combined figure. Replaces gut-feel ordering with a comparable number, so the loudest idea doesn't automatically win. |
| Humphrey, A. — Stanford Research Institute (1960s); matrix form Weihrich, H. (1982) | Sets internal strengths and weaknesses against external opportunities and threats on a single frame. Starts a decision from a clear-eyed read of both rather than one side alone. | |
| Weihrich, H. (1982), Long Range Planning | Pairs internal factors with external ones to generate strategy — strengths against opportunities, weaknesses against threats, and so on. Turns a static audit into concrete moves by forcing each combination to suggest an action. | |
| Stress-test the runway | Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Breaks total burn into its underlying drivers — headcount, marketing, infrastructure, one-offs — so a change in runway can be traced to a specific lever. Shows which line item moves the runway and by how much. |
| Klein, G. (2007), Harvard Business Review | Names the small set of assumptions that, if wrong, would end the runway, and stress-tests each in isolation. Turns vague risk into a specific list of conditions worth watching. | |
| Wack, P. (1985), Harvard Business Review; Royal Dutch/Shell | Builds best, base, and downside runway views on the same drivers so the difference between them is the assumption, not the arithmetic. Surfaces how much runway depends on each contested input. | |
| Think through a life decision | Klein, G. (2007), Harvard Business Review | Imagines the decision has already led to regret, then works backwards to name why. Surfaces the assumptions and trade-offs that are easy to wave away in the moment of choosing. |
| Raths, L., Harmin, M. & Simon, S. (1966), Values and Teaching | Helps a person identify and prioritise what they genuinely value through structured reflection. Surfaces the priorities behind a personal decision. |
| Product | Source | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 360 Feedback | McClelland, D. (1973) | Draws out how someone actually behaved in specific past situations rather than how they say they would. Works through the situation, their role, the actions taken, and the outcome to surface recurring patterns. |
| Goleman, D. (1995) | Measures how well someone recognises and handles emotion — their own and others' — across self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill. Gives a common vocabulary for reading interpersonal competence. | |
| Kouzes, J. M., & Posner, B. Z. (2017) | Assesses leadership against five behaviours that recur when leaders are at their best — modelling, inspiring, challenging, enabling, and encouraging. Grounds the read in what someone does, not who they are. | |
| Behavioural Profile Assessment | Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992) | Describes personality across five measured traits — openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, emotional stability — rather than fixed types. Used here as a structure for reading observable patterns, not as a self-report test. |
| McClelland, D. C. (1961) | Reads sustained effort and consistency of interest across long horizons where feedback is slow and setbacks are common. Distinguishes staying power from short bursts of intensity, and from stubbornness once the evidence has turned. | |
| Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985) | Explains motivation through three needs — autonomy, competence, and connection — rather than reward and punishment. Surfaces what makes engagement genuine rather than forced. | |
| Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988) | Reads whether someone treats ability as fixed or as something built through effort, feedback, and practice, and how that shapes their response to setbacks and challenge. Grounded in the difference between learning-goal and performance-goal orientations. | |
| Crisis Decision | Coombs, W. T. (2007) | Matches the response to the type of crisis and how responsible the organisation is seen to be. Shows when to deny, diminish, or rebuild. |
| Coram, R. (2002) | Frames fast decision-making as a repeating cycle — observe, orient, decide, act. Surfaces how quickly someone can size up a situation and respond before it shifts. | |
| Klein, G. (1998) | Explains how experts decide under pressure by recognising patterns rather than weighing every option. Surfaces how experience lets someone act both fast and well. | |
| Culture Pulse | Schein, E. H. (2017) | Examines culture at three levels — visible habits, stated values, and the assumptions no one questions. Surfaces the deep beliefs that actually drive how an organisation behaves. |
| Edmondson, A. (1999) | Measures whether people on a team will speak up, admit mistakes, and challenge each other without fear. Surfaces the conditions that let a team learn rather than hide. | |
| Difficult Conversation | Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1996) | Reads feedback along two qualities held together: genuine care for the person and willingness to challenge the work directly. Care without challenge slides into avoidance; challenge without care lands as attack and is rejected. |
| Edmondson, A. (1999) | Keeps a high-stakes conversation open by maintaining enough safety to speak, to be disagreed with, and to change one's mind, so the real issue surfaces rather than being routed around. The willingness to raise hard topics is what predicts team learning, not personality or skill alone. | |
| Rogers, C. R. (1957) | Separates what was observed, without evaluation, from the feeling it produced, the need behind that feeling, and a clear request for what would help. Keeps the exchange on shared ground — observable behaviour and stated needs — rather than interpretation and blame. | |
| Engagement Pulse | Hackman, J. R., & Oldham, G. R. (1976) | Shows which features of a job make it motivating — variety, identity, significance, autonomy, and feedback. Reads where work engages people and where it drains them. |
| Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985) | Explains motivation through three needs — autonomy, competence, and connection — rather than reward and punishment. Surfaces what makes engagement genuine rather than forced. | |
| Founder Readiness | Kegan, R. (1982) | A sincere goal often stalls because a second, protective commitment pulls the other way, held in place by unexamined assumptions. Surfacing that competing commitment and testing its assumptions is what allows movement — willpower alone rarely does. |
| Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985) | Explains motivation through three needs — autonomy, competence, and connection — rather than reward and punishment. Surfaces what makes engagement genuine rather than forced. | |
| Leadership Self-Assessment | Kahneman, D. (2011) | Separates fast, instinctive judgment from slow, deliberate reasoning, and shows where each one misleads. Surfaces when a quick call needs the slower system to check it. |
| Goleman, D. (1995) | Measures how well someone recognises and handles emotion — their own and others' — across self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill. Gives a common vocabulary for reading interpersonal competence. | |
| Kouzes, J. M., & Posner, B. Z. (2017) | Assesses leadership against five behaviours that recur when leaders are at their best — modelling, inspiring, challenging, enabling, and encouraging. Grounds the read in what someone does, not who they are. | |
| Organisation Pulse | Kouzes, J. M., & Posner, B. Z. (2017) | Assesses leadership against five behaviours that recur when leaders are at their best — modelling, inspiring, challenging, enabling, and encouraging. Grounds the read in what someone does, not who they are. |
| Schein, E. H. (2017) | Examines culture at three levels — visible habits, stated values, and the assumptions no one questions. Surfaces the deep beliefs that actually drive how an organisation behaves. | |
| Edmondson, A. (1999) | Measures whether people on a team will speak up, admit mistakes, and challenge each other without fear. Surfaces the conditions that let a team learn rather than hide. | |
| Role Clarity | Hackman, J. R., & Oldham, G. R. (1976) | Shows which features of a job make it motivating — variety, identity, significance, autonomy, and feedback. Reads where work engages people and where it drains them. |
| Project Management Institute (2017). A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide) — 6th ed. PMI. Origin traced to responsibility-charting work of the 1970s. | Names, for each task, who is responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed. Removes the ambiguity over ownership that quietly stalls cross-team work. | |
| Strengths Profile | McClelland, D. (1973) | Draws out how someone actually behaved in specific past situations rather than how they say they would. Works through the situation, their role, the actions taken, and the outcome to surface recurring patterns. |
| Hackman, J. R., & Oldham, G. R. (1976) | Shows which features of a job make it motivating — variety, identity, significance, autonomy, and feedback. Reads where work engages people and where it drains them. | |
| Team Alignment | Doerr, J. (2018). Measure What Matters. Portfolio. Originated by Andy Grove at Intel (1970s); popularised at Google. | Pairs an ambitious objective with a few measurable key results that show whether it was actually met. Forces the difference between intent and evidence, so progress is tracked by outcome rather than activity. |
| Hackman, J. R. (2002) | Reads a team against the enabling conditions that account for most of the difference between teams that perform and those that don't — a real bounded team, clear direction, an enabling structure, a supportive context, and good coaching. Diagnoses the missing condition rather than the visible symptom. | |
| Team Dynamics | Edmondson, A. (1999) | Measures whether people on a team will speak up, admit mistakes, and challenge each other without fear. Surfaces the conditions that let a team learn rather than hide. |
| Hackman, J. R. (2002) | Reads a team against the enabling conditions that account for most of the difference between teams that perform and those that don't — a real bounded team, clear direction, an enabling structure, a supportive context, and good coaching. Diagnoses the missing condition rather than the visible symptom. | |
| Tuckman, B. W. (1965) | Locates where a team sits on the path from forming, through storming and norming, to performing. Treats friction as a stage to move through, not a failure. | |
| Values Clarification | Kegan, R. (1982) | A sincere goal often stalls because a second, protective commitment pulls the other way, held in place by unexamined assumptions. Surfacing that competing commitment and testing its assumptions is what allows movement — willpower alone rarely does. |
| Schwartz, S. H. (1992) | Maps the core values that drive behaviour and where they pull against each other — openness versus tradition, self-interest versus the collective. Surfaces what genuinely motivates someone. |
| Product | Source | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Candidate Interview Simulation | Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1998) | Holds every candidate to the same questions and scoring, so comparisons are fair and predictive. Replaces gut-feel impressions with consistent, defensible evidence. |
| Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1998) | Scores the discipline of follow-up questioning during a selection interview — whether the interviewer drilled into concrete situations, actions, and outcomes when a candidate offered a general or rehearsed answer. Grounded in the same structured-interviewing evidence base that shows behaviour-anchored, evidence-led questioning predicts job performance roughly twice as well as unstructured chemistry-based interviewing. | |
| Child Safety Simulation | Munro, E. (2011) | Shifts child-protection practice from box-ticking toward the professional judgment that actually keeps children safe. Reads a system by whether it serves the child or the process. |
| Turnell, A., & Edwards, S. (1999) | Frames a protection decision around three questions — what's the danger, what's working, and what would safety look like. Balances risk against strengths rather than risk alone. | |
| Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. (2014) | Shapes how to work with people so support doesn't re-open the harm they've lived through. Reads safety, trust, and choice as conditions for any real help. | |
| Clinical Judgement Simulation | Higgs, J., Jeffery-Cao, S., Carstens-Visser, M., Christensen, N., & Jensen, G. M. (Eds.). (2019) | Frames how a practitioner moves from scattered signs to a sound, examined judgment. Makes the steps of diagnostic thinking explicit so the reasoning can be checked, not just the conclusion. |
| Croskerry, P. (2003) | Names the thinking traps — anchoring, premature closure, availability — that lead a clinician to the wrong call. Surfaces where a fast judgment may have skipped a step. | |
| Endsley, M. R. (1995) | Tracks how well someone perceives what's happening, grasps what it means, and projects what comes next. Surfaces where attention is keeping pace with the situation and where it's falling behind. | |
| Elwyn, G., Frosch, D., Thomson, R., Joseph-Williams, N., Lloyd, A., Kinnersley, P., et al. (2012) | Brings the person into the decision, weighing the options against what matters to them. Replaces a verdict handed down with a choice made together. | |
| Crisis Management Simulation | Coombs, W. T. (2007) | Matches the response to the type of crisis and how responsible the organisation is seen to be. Shows when to deny, diminish, or rebuild. |
| Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2017) | Organises who's in charge of what during an emergency, so the response doesn't fragment. Sets a clear command structure that scales with the size of the incident. | |
| Coram, R. (2002) | Frames fast decision-making as a repeating cycle — observe, orient, decide, act. Surfaces how quickly someone can size up a situation and respond before it shifts. | |
| Klein, G. (1998) | Explains how experts decide under pressure by recognising patterns rather than weighing every option. Surfaces how experience lets someone act both fast and well. | |
| Customer Complaint Simulation | McCollough, M. A., & Bharadwaj, S. G. (1992) | Shows that fixing a failure well can leave a customer more loyal than if nothing had gone wrong. Reads recovery as an opportunity, not just damage control. |
| Tax, S. S., Brown, S. W., & Chandrashekaran, M. (1998) | Works a complaint through a consistent arc — surface it without defensiveness, acknowledge the experience, take ownership, resolve the issue, and feed the root cause back. Customers judge the recovery on procedural, interactional, and distributive fairness, and the arc maps to all three. | |
| Customer Discovery Simulation | Janz, T., Hellervik, L., & Gilmore, D. C. (1986) | Keeps questions grounded in what the person has actually done, not what they think they would do or whether they like an idea. Past behaviour and specific stories are stronger signals than hypothetical opinion or general claims. |
| Ulwick, A. W. (2002) | Anchors customer analysis in the underlying job the customer is trying to get done — the progress they want in their situation — rather than demographics or features. Reveals the real competitive set, which is the customer's current workaround, and the outcomes that count as success. | |
| Ethics Under Pressure Simulation | Bazerman, M. H., & Tenbrunsel, A. E. (2011) | Shows how decent people make unethical choices without noticing — through framing, time pressure, and gradual slippage. Surfaces the blind spots that let good intentions drift. |
| Rest, J. R. (1986) | Breaks ethical action into four steps — recognising the issue, judging what's right, intending to act, and following through. Shows where good intentions break down on the way to action. | |
| Financial Advice Simulation | Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) | Explains the predictable ways people misjudge money and risk — loss aversion, overconfidence, anchoring. Treats financial behaviour as patterned and biased rather than coldly rational. |
| Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 77 (American Law Institute, 2007) | Holds an adviser to acting in the client's best interest, ahead of their own. Sets the standard against which advice and conduct are judged. | |
| Financial Action Task Force (FATF). (2012, updated 2023) | Verifies who a client really is before doing business with them. Sets the standard for identity, source of funds, and risk checks. | |
| FINRA Rule 2111 — Suitability. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. SEC Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI), 17 CFR 240.15l-1. Securities and Exchange Commission (2019) | Tests whether a recommendation fits the specific client it's made to — their needs, risk, and circumstances. Sets the bar a recommendation has to clear. | |
| Leadership Simulation | Heifetz, R. A. (1994) | Separates problems that have a known fix from those that need people themselves to change. Shows where authority solves the issue and where the harder work of shifting behaviour and values is what's actually required. |
| Hersey, P., & Blanchard, K. H. (1977) | Matches how much direction a person needs to how ready they are for the task. Shows when to direct, coach, support, or step back. | |
| Managing Up Simulation | Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1996) | Reads feedback along two qualities held together: genuine care for the person and willingness to challenge the work directly. Care without challenge slides into avoidance; challenge without care lands as attack and is rejected. |
| Cohen, A. R., & Bradford, D. L. (1989) | Shows how to get things done through others when you can't simply tell them to. Built on reciprocity — understanding what others value and trading on it. | |
| Meeting Facilitation Simulation | Delbecq, A. L., Van de Ven, A. H., & Gustafson, D. H. (1975) | Uses simple structures — silent generation before discussion, paired exchange before group share, rotating roles — to distribute participation so the full range of thinking surfaces. Structured turn-taking produces more, and more diverse, ideas than open discussion alone. |
| Schwarz, R. (2017) | Sets the explicit behaviours that keep a group's thinking honest — testing assumptions, sharing reasoning, focusing on interests. Keeps a discussion productive rather than political. | |
| Negotiation Simulation | Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) | Examines how an opening offer sets the frame and how the give-and-take that follows shapes where a negotiation lands. Surfaces where a starting position and concession rhythm are quietly steering the outcome. |
| Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011) | Focuses negotiation on interests and fair standards rather than fixed positions and willpower. Looks for the agreement that meets what both sides actually need. | |
| Performance Conversation Simulation | Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1996) | Reads feedback along two qualities held together: genuine care for the person and willingness to challenge the work directly. Care without challenge slides into avoidance; challenge without care lands as attack and is rejected. |
| — | Breaks a hard conversation into the layers underneath it — what happened, the feelings involved, and what it means for each person's sense of themselves. Lets a stuck exchange move forward instead of circling, by surfacing what is actually being negotiated beneath the operational issue. | |
| Presentation Under Pressure Simulation | Aristotle (c. 350 BCE / 2007) | Builds a persuasive case on three foundations together — credibility, emotion, and logic. Shows where an argument is strong and where it leans too hard on one and neglects the others. |
| Minto, B. (2009) | Orders a message so the main point comes first and everything else supports it. Structures communication for a reader who wants the answer before the detail. | |
| Prioritisation Under Pressure Simulation | Reinertsen, D. G. (2009) | Quantifies what waiting actually costs, so timing decisions stop being guesses. Makes the price of delay visible against the work itself, and shows what to sequence first. |
| Popularised by Covey, S. R. (1989). The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People. Free Press. Attribution to Eisenhower's 1954 speech is widely cited but folkloric. | Splits what's urgent from what's important, so the urgent stops crowding out the important. Sorts work into act now, schedule, delegate, or drop. | |
| Public Safety Simulation | Richmond, J. S., Berlin, J. S., Fishkind, A. B., Holloman, G. H., Zeller, S. L., Wilson, M. P., Rifai, M. A., & Ng, A. T. (2012) | Brings the temperature down in a charged encounter before it turns into harm. Shifts a confrontation toward calm through tone, pace, and acknowledgment rather than force. |
| Endsley, M. R. (1995) | Tracks how well someone perceives what's happening, grasps what it means, and projects what comes next. Surfaces where attention is keeping pace with the situation and where it's falling behind. | |
| College of Policing. (2014, updated 2023) | Structures high-stakes operational decisions around a shared, defensible process — assessing information, weighing powers and options, then acting. Makes a fast decision auditable after the fact. | |
| Tyler, T. R. (1990) | Shows that how a decision is made shapes whether people accept it, as much as the outcome itself. Weighs fairness of process, not just result. | |
| Sales Discovery Simulation | Hanan, M., Cribbin, J., & Heiser, H. (1970) | Sequences a sales conversation from the buyer's situation, to the underlying problem, to its implications, to the value of solving it. Moves a buyer from a vague issue to a felt need, replacing feature-led pitching with consultative dialogue. |
| Nagle, T. T., & Holden, R. K. (1987) | Frames the conversation around the value the buyer cares about — the economic outcome, the cost of the current state, the decision criteria — rather than product features. Reads whether the seller is helping the buyer build the business case internally, which is what enterprise buyers select on. | |
| Saying No Simulation | Simon, H. A. (1971) | Concentrates effort on the vital few rather than spreading thin across the many useful. The discipline is the willingness to decline good work so the most important work gets the attention it needs — not time management. |
| — | Breaks a hard conversation into the layers underneath it — what happened, the feelings involved, and what it means for each person's sense of themselves. Lets a stuck exchange move forward instead of circling, by surfacing what is actually being negotiated beneath the operational issue. | |
| Stakeholder Influence Simulation | Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011) | Focuses negotiation on interests and fair standards rather than fixed positions and willpower. Looks for the agreement that meets what both sides actually need. |
| Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997) | Ranks stakeholders by power, legitimacy, and urgency, so attention goes where it counts. Sorts who must be managed closely from who can be monitored. | |
| Strategic Decision Simulation | Snowden, D. J., & Boone, M. E. (2007) | Sorts a situation by how knowable it is — clear, complicated, complex, or chaotic — so the response fits the kind of problem. Stops a complex problem being treated as if it had a simple answer. |
| Coram, R. (2002) | Frames fast decision-making as a repeating cycle — observe, orient, decide, act. Surfaces how quickly someone can size up a situation and respond before it shifts. | |
| Team Conflict Simulation | Blake, R. R., & Mouton, J. S. (1964) | Reads conflict-handling along two axes — how directly the conflict is addressed and how fairly competing interests are balanced. Treats the ability to flex between modes as the marker of skill, rather than any single mode being correct. |
| Edmondson, A. (1999) | Keeps a high-stakes conversation open by maintaining enough safety to speak, to be disagreed with, and to change one's mind, so the real issue surfaces rather than being routed around. The willingness to raise hard topics is what predicts team learning, not personality or skill alone. |
Every scored dimension has a published rubric with five behavioural anchors at 90, 70, 50, 30, and 10. Each anchor describes what someone operating at that level visibly does — observable behaviour, not personality traits.
Ren matches the evidence in the conversation to the closest anchor and reports that anchor’s number. When the evidence sits between two bands, Ren rounds down — we would rather understate than inflate.
Each rubric is grounded in established research. For example, the Trust rubric draws on team-effectiveness research and Edmondson’s psychological safety (1999, 2018); the Decision Quality rubric draws on Kahneman, Klein and others. The frameworks behind each report are listed in the report’s “Foundation” section.
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Treat each score as a prompt for reflection rather than a fixed truth. Use the report alongside your own experience, feedback from people who know you in context, and any formal assessments you trust.
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Every Renatus product is built on established research — frameworks gathered from across the world and evaluated for each purpose. Where a single framework has demonstrated limitations, we combine several to build a complete structure. The frameworks behind each report are listed in its Foundation section, so you can always see what the analysis rests on.
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